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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RONALD G. CLARK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 17037 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ronald G. Clark, was charged with 
the theft of three turkeys in violation of § 76-6-404 and 
§ 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amen~ed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 29, 1980 trial was held before the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge in and for the S:ixth Judicial 
District Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, sitting 
without a jury. Judge Tibbs £ound the appellant guilty of 
theft, a third degree felony, as charged. On April 9, 1980 
the appellant was sentenced to a term not to exceed five years 
in the Utah State Prison and fined the sum of $1500.00. 
Judge Tibbs suspended the prison sentence, and placed the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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appellant on probation for two years upon the conditions 
that the appellant serve ninety {90) days in the Juab 
County Jail, make restitution in the amount of $45.00, 
refrain from the use of any intoxicants, and not possess 
any weapons during the term of probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the guilty verdict 
rendered and of the sentence imposed, and affirmation of 
the constitutionality of Section 76-6-412(1) {b) {i~i) Utah 
Code Annotated {1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 19, 1979, at approximately 2:00 a.m., 
Richard Ray Olsen and his brother Douglas Hall Olsen were 
on their turkey farm located approximately four miles north 
of Ephraim, Utah. As they were leaving their farm they saw 
the appel~ant inside one of their fenced turkey pens {R. 16, 22). 
Richard Olsen testified that he heard a truck idling, and 
both brothers heard someone hitting the turkeys {R. 17, 23). 
The brothers walked to the idling truck and watched 
the appellant in their turkey pens {R. 17). The appellant 
approached the two brothers carrying three dead turkeys {R. 17, 
23). The brothers confronted the appellant asking him what 
he was doing (R. 18, 23). Appellant dropped the turkeys and 
replied, "I'm just picking up dead turkeys." (R. 18, 23). 
-2-
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A substantial discussion between the appellant 
and the two brothers followed, lasting for almost three 
hours (R. 19) , during which time the appellant denied any 
wrong doing (R. 24). Douglas Olsen finally left the turkey 
farm to notify the sheriff (R. 26) when it appeared that 
the appellant would not let the Olsens "take him in." (R. 20). 
Appellant was finally arrested in Ephraim after he followed 
Richard Olsen into town (R. 20) . 
Appellant was charged with violating Sections 
76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended to which he entered a plea of not guilty. In 
addition to the testimony of the Olsen brothers, the testimony 
of the investigating officer was stipulated to. Officer 
Buchanan would have testified that boots taken from the 
defendant had fresh blood on them, and that he found a base 
ball bat in the turkey pen with fresh blood on it (R. 30) . 
Appellant's counsel had no objection to the admission of the 
proffered testimony (R. 30). 
After the prosecution rested its case, the appellant 
moved to have the information dismissed on the ground the 
state had failed to meet the elements of the crime of theft 
(R. 31). This motion was denied and the case submitted to the 
court (R. 32). 
The trial judge found the appellant guilty of theft 
-3-
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as charged (R. 33). Although appellant's counsel was willing 
to waive the time for sentencing, the court ordered a pre-
sentence investigation and report (R. 35). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 76-6-412 (1) (b} .{iii} U.C.A. (1953), 
AS AMENDED, DOES Nor VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION. 
Appellant contends that Section 76-6-412 (1) (b} (iii) 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, which classifies the 
theft of livestock, including poultry, as a third degree 
felony, denies equal protection in that it makes no reference 
to the value of the animals stolen in determining the felonious 
nature of the offense. It is respondent's position that the 
legislative classification is reasonable, and therefore the 
statute does not deny equal protection under either the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Utah. 
Although appellant correctly cites State v. Logan, 
563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that market 
value is the appropriate test to be used in determining the 
value of stolen property, appellant has failed to cite the 
entire language of Logan. This Court in Logan stated: 
In general, the common law gradation 
of the offense of larceny that is 
based on the value of the property 
stolen has been retained in most 
jurisdictions, and in the absence 
of statutes providing otherwise, the 
measure of the value is its fair 
market value at the time and place 
where the alleged crime was committed. 
[Footnotes omitted] (Emphas):.,~ ~~1~~~~~~, 
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Id. at 813. The language of Logan indicates that market 
value is to be used only if there is no statute, "providing 
otherwise." Such is not the case here. In this case a 
specific statutory provision classifies the theft of animals, 
including poultry, as a third degree felony. Specific statutes 
making theft a felony regardless of the value of the thing 
stolen have consistently been held valid. See 52A C.J.S. §62. 
In states having statutes similar to Utah's livestock 
theft statute, Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) U.C.A., challenges 
based on equal protection have failed. In People v. Burns, 
593 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1979), the Colorado Supreme Court confronted 
an identical challenge to the one before this Court. The 
appellant in Burns was convicted of the theft of a calf. 
On appeal, appellant contended that the Colorado "theft of 
animals" statute which classified the theft as a felony, was 
unconstitutional. The appellant claimed that the value of 
the calf was $40-50 and therefore he would only be guilty of 
a misdemeanor, but for the specific "theft of animals" statute. 
Like the appellant in the instant case, Burns argued that 
such a distinction deprived him of equal protection of the 
law. The Colorado Court rejected his argument stating: 
We find this challenge to be with-
out merit. An equal protection problem 
arises only where different statutes 
prescribe different penalties for the 
same conduct. However, the theft of 
animals statute relates specifically 
-5-
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. to theft of animals, conduct which 
is distinguishable from theft of 
other articles. This distinction 
has been made by the legislature, 
which obviously has concluded that 
theft of animals is a crime of 
greater consequence to society in 
this state than a general theft and 
that it requires a greater penalty. 
In People v. Czajkowski, 193 
Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977), we 
addressed the same challenge with 
respect to the ·"theft of auto parts" 
statute. We said there: 
"Simply because an act may 
violate more than one statutory 
provision does not invalidate the 
legislation in question, so long 
as the legislative classification 
is not arbitrary or unreasonable, 
and the differences in the provisions 
bear a reasonable relationship to 
the persons included and the public 
policy to be achieved. [Citations 
omitted.]" 568 P.2d at 25. 
The Czajkowski rationale is 
controlling here. We do not think 
that the distinction made by the 
legislature between a general theft 
and theft of animals is arbitrary or 
unreasonable. Rather, it displays a 
legitimate legislative judgment. Thus 
there is no violation of equal protec-
tion here. People v. Marshall, Colo., 
5 8 6 p • 2d 41 ( 19 7 8 ) . 
Id. at 353. [Footnotes omitted] (emphasis added) . 
Likewise in State v. Webb, 528 P.2d 669 (Idaho 1974), 
the appellant argued that classifying theft of livestock, 
regardless of value, into one class for the purpose of fixing 
the degree of the offense was unreasonable, arbitrary, and 
discriminatory. In affirming the constitutionality of the 
-6-
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Idaho statute, the Court reviewed the history of the 
legislation: 
Since territorial times Idaho has 
consistently treated the larceny of 
livestock differently from larceny of 
other personalty, in that the punishment 
for larceny of livestock has not been 
dependent on the monetary value of the 
property taken. [Citations omitted] 
Other states have affirmed the validity 
of statutes specifically classifying 
the larceny of livestock separately and 
providing harsher penalties than for 
other types of larceny. See, State v. 
Pacheco, 81 N.M. 97, 463 P.2d 521 (Ct. 
App. 1969); People v. Andrich, 135 Cal. 
App. 274, 26 P.2d 902 (1933). Historically, 
the protection of certain classes of 
property, in this case livestock, was 
considered essential to deter a type of 
theft easy of commission, but difficult 
to detect. 
Legislatures are accorded wide dis-
cretion in both the classification of 
subject matter to be protected by criminal 
laws and in the establishment of punish-
ments for the violation of such criminal 
laws. 
Id. at 670. The Idaho Court determined that the classification 
of livestock theft was reasonable, stating: 
The legislature specifically desig-
nated larceny of livestock as an "evil" 
to be regulated with stricter penalties 
than other types of larceny. The separate 
classification of larceny of livestock bears 
a reasonable relationship to the protection 
of an industry difficult to safeguard while 
marking a class of of fenders which experience 
dictates as deserving special treatment. 
We find no merit in the defendant's 
argument that the legislature's specific 
classification of larceny for livestock with 
-7-
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resulting harsher penalties in relation 
to other degrees of larceny deprived him 
of any constitutional safeguards or rights. 
Id. at 671. 
The Utah legislature has similarly determined 
that theft of livestock is an "eviln requiring harsher 
penalties than other thefts. Separate classifications for 
livestock have been in effect- in Utah since 1876. 
This Court stated in In re Gannett, 11 U. 283, 
39 P. 496 (Utah 1895): 
The degree of such an offense does 
not depend on the value of the property 
stolen, because it is made grand larceny 
byt the statute, regardless of value, and 
must be punished likewise. 
Id. at 497. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant also argues that Section 76-6-412(1) (bl (iii)i 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) , as amended violates equal · I 
protection because it allows a prosecutor to charge either I 
a felony or a misdemeanor on the same set of £acts. However, 
as long as there exists a reasonable basis for distinguishing 
between theft of animals and theft based on the value of the 
object taken, the fact that an act can be either a felony 
or misdemeanor does not create a constitutional objection, 
nor does it confer upon the defendant a constitutional right 
to be prosecuted for a misdemeanor. State v. Dumont, 471 
P.2d 847 (Ore.App. 1970). 
-8-
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The legislature has determined that the theft 
of livestock, including poultry is a more severe offense 
than the theft of three frozen turkeys from a supermarket. 
The distinction is both reasonable and rationale. As the 
New Mexico Court stated in State v. Pacheco, 463 P.2d 521 
(1969): 
. . . the larceny of livestock statute 
was apparently enacted to protect the 
ownership of thereof, to prevent a kind 
of larceny peculiarly easy of commission 
and difficult of discovery and punishment, 
and to protect the important industry of 
stock raising. 
Id. at 524. 
The classification of theft of livestock as a 
third degree felony regardless of the value of the animals 
is a reasonable legislative distinction, and as such is 
not a violation of equal protection. Respondent respectfully 
asks this Court to reject appellant's constitutional challenge 
and to affirm the constitutionality of Section 76-6-412(1) (b) 
(iii) • 
POINT II 
SECTION 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE IT APPLIES 
EQUALLY TO ALL CITIZENS; NOR IS IT 
A SPECIAL LAW IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 
VI, SECTION 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH. 
Appellant asserts that Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, is a private or 
-9-
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special law contrary to Article VI, Section 26 of the 
Constitution of Utah. Respondent submits that the statute 
is a general law, therefore the statute is constitutional 
since it applies equally to all persons who steal livestock 
in the State of Utah. Furthermore, legislative enactments 
are presumed valid absent a showing that the legislature 
went beyond the Constitution. 
In McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, 
603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979), this Court wrote: 
Id at 788. 
In Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. 
v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Assoc., 564 
P.2d 751 (Utah 1977), this Court defined 
a general law as one which applies to 
and operates uniformly upon all members 
of any class of persons. 
Such is the case with the Utah livestock statute. 
All persons who steal livestock in Utah are subject to 
prosecution under Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code 
Annotated. The statute does not rest on an arbitrary 
classification, nor does it invidiously discriminate. In 
a similar challenge to the one now before this Court, the 
appellant in State v. Pacheco, 463 P.2d 521 (New Mexico 
App. 1969) argued that the theft of livestock statute 
under which he was sentenced violated the special legislation 
provisions of the Constitution of New Mexico. The challenged 
provision of the New Mexico Constitution is comparable to 
-10-
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Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution. In 
rejecting the appellant's claim the court found that the 
portion of the larceny statute making it a felony to steal 
livestock regardless of its value thereof applied to all 
persons who steal livestock in New Mexico and therefore 
did not constitute special legislation contrary to the 
New Mexico Constitution. 
Furthermore, appellant's contentions that the 
statute was enacted as a result of special interest lobbying 
is an argument which can be applied to many kinds of legis-
lation. An individual selling real estate without a license 
would be able to assert that the licensing requirement was a 
special law enacted by the legislature in response to efforts 
by realtors to limit their numbers. Adoption of appellant's 
argument would open the floodgates to claims of "special 
laws." 
Finally appellant has merely speculated that the 
legislature amended Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) to include 
poultry because of lobbying efforts. It cannot be assumed 
that the legislature acted without exercising its own discretion. 
As the New Mexico Court said in Pacheco, supra: 
Every presumption is to be indulged 
in favor of the validity and regularity 
of legislation, and it will not be declared 
unconstitutional, unless the court is satis-
fied beyond all reasonable doubt that the 
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Legislature went outside the Constitution 
in enacting it. [Citations omitted.} 
Id. at 523. 
Since the statute applies equally to all people, 
and appellant has failed to show that the legislature went 
beyond the Constitution in enacting this statute, this 
Court should reject appellant's claim that Section 76-6-412 
(1) (b) (iii) is a special law in violation of Article VI, 
Section 26 of the Constitution of Utah. 
POINT III 
A SENTENCE WITHIN STATUTORY LIMITS 
IS NOT EXCESSIVE WHERE THE APPELLANT 
FAILS TO SHOW CLEAR JUDICIAL ABUSE. 
Appellant was found guilty of theft, a third degree 
felony under Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended. Section 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) provides: 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as follows ..• 
(3) In the case of a felony of a 
third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years . . . 
Furthermore, Section 76-3-301, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
states: 
A person who has been convicted of an 
offense may be sentenced to pay a fine 
not exceedinq: 
(2) $5000:00 when the conviction is 
of a felony of the third degree. 
-12-
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Lastly Section 76-3-201(3) (a) Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
states: 
When a person is adjudged guilty of 
criminal activities which have resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to 
any other sentence it may impose; the 
court may order that the defendant make 
restitution to the victim. 
Appellant contends that the sentence of the court 
was excessive and arbitrarily and prejudicially imposed. 
However under applicable Utah law, the appellant was sentenced 
within the limits imposed by statute. Respondent asserts that 
absent a showing of judicial abuse, a sentence within statutory 
limits is neither excessive nor arbitrary. Appellant has 
failed to show any judicial abuse, therefore respondent 
respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
sentence. 
In State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978), the 
appellant pled guilty to a reduced charge in anticipation of 
probation. The trial judge refused to allow him to withdraw 
his guilty plea and instead sentenced him. Although the 
issues on appeal differed from those in the instant case, 
this Court in Harris pronounced the general rule with r.egard 
to sentencing: 
Upon conviction of a crime, whether by 
verdict or by plea, the matter of the 
sentence to be imposed rests entirely 
within the discretion of the court, 
-13-
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within the limits prescribed by law. 
Id. at 453 (Emphasis added.) 
This statement is in accord with the majority of 
jurisdictions. The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Ward, 
569 P.2d 916 (Idaho 1977), stated: 
This court has long held that 
sentencing is generally within the 
trial court's discretion and will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless 
a clear.abuse of discretion is shown, 
and that ordinarily there is no abuse 
of discretion where the sentence is 
within its statutory limit. 
Id at 920. (Emphasis added.) See also Hanson v. State, 
590 P.2d 832 (Wyoming 1979); State v. Whitehead, 596 P.2d 
370 (Ariz. 1979). 
The appellant has failed to meet his burden of 
showing that the trial judge clearly abused his discretion. 
State v. Seifart, 597 P.2d 44 (Idaho 1979). The statement 
by the trial judge that he wanted to make an example of 
appellant, cannot be viewed as jud-.ical abuse. As was stated 
in People v. McKnight, 588 P.2d 886 (Colorado App. 1978): 
Punishment of an offender, protection 
of society, and rehabilitation of an 
of fender are not the only reasons for 
incarceration; deterrence of similar 
acts by others is also a consideration. 
[Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 888 (emphasis added). 
Similarly in State v. Adams, 577 P.2d 1123 (Idaho 
-14-
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1978), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the appellant's 
sentence saying: 
The district court acknowledged that the 
sentence would be of no rehabilitative 
value to the defendant, but nevertheless 
imposed the two year period of incarceration 
in order to deter others from committing 
similar offenses. General deterrence is 
one of the several objectives of criminal 
punishment and has been held to be a 
sufficient reason for imposing a prison 
sent~. [Footnotes omitted]. 
Id. at 1124 (emphasis added). 
The appellant was found guilty of a third degree 
felony and was sentenced within the limits prescribed by 
law. Consequently, absent a showing of clear judicial abuse, 
this sentence should be affirmed. Appellant has failed to 
show any abuse by the trial judge. Furthermore, the mere 
fact that the sentence may be harsh does not make it an 
abuse of discretion. Finally it should be noted that although 
a third degree felony carries the possibility of five years 
imprisonment and a maximum fine of $5000 .. 00, the appellant's 
prison sentence was suspended, and probation imposed. Appellant 
should not be heard to challenge his punishment as excessive 
when it falls far below the maximum possible penalty. 
For the aboveforementioned reasons, respondent 
respectfully asks this Court to deny appellant's claim and 
to affirm the trial court's sentence. 
-15-
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the foregoing points and 
authorities support the constitutionality of Section 76-6-412 
(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, and the 
actions of the trial court in sentencing the appellant. 
Therefore, respondent respectfully asks this Court to affirm 
the appellant's conviction and sentence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-16-
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